The real estate literature recognizes the real option to invest in capital expenditures (CAPEX) or sell a property but treats these options as independent. We show that these real options are interconnected. We provide empirical evidence that, consistent with the real option framework, CAPEX increases in income growth expectations but declines in their volatility; that CAPEX are partially capitalized into property market values; and that CAPEX signifcantly reduce the subsequent likelihood of sale. We also present evidence that, controlling for market timing, past property performance infuences CAPEX but not disposition choices, consistent with a value-add investment strategy. 
Introduction
Unlike many other investment assets, such as fnancial securities, real estate investors have a set of active management choices available to them while holding the asset. These choices include the sale of the asset but also the choice to make follow-on investments in the form of capital expenditures (CAPEX) to improve the asset. To date, the real estate investment literature has treated these two real options as separate from one another. In this paper, we show that the option to invest in CAPEX and the option to sell are interconnected and, on this basis, provide novel evidence to explain typical investment and disposition patterns.
We model investment in CAPEX as a real option to restore an asset that has su˙ered physical depreciation and economic obsolescence to its new, undepreciated state. We then consider the investor's real option to sell the asset by incorporating the concept of highest and best use versus second-best use (see, e.g., Munneke and Womack, 2017) . By combining the optimal time to invest in CAPEX with the highest and best use assumption, we obtain a set of testable hypotheses about the occurrence of CAPEX as a function of economic fundamentals, the implications for asset value, and the likelihood of sale following CAPEX investments.
We test our empirical predictions in a sample of commercial property investments obtained from the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) for the period 2001 to 2014. The data set contains observations on large, institutional-grade assets owned by pension funds and insurance companies. Unlike other data sources, NCREIF o˙ers detail on asset-level follow-up investments in the form of CAPEX. At the same time, the data set is rich in asset details, allowing us to control for a wide array of observable property and fnancial characteristics that aid identifcation by reducing omitted variable bias. The time-series dimension of the data set, which spans more than one full real estate market cycle, allows us to incorporate lag structures into our estimation to address simultaneity bias.
We then document the real option aspect of CAPEX investments empirically. Consistent with our hypotheses, the results suggest that investors increase CAPEX spending during periods with higher expected market-level income growth, which increases the return on CAPEX projects. We estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in market-level rental growth expectations is associated with an increase in CAPEX spending of 17 percent relative to the mean. By contrast, investors reduce CAPEX spending in periods with higher volatility of those growth expectations, when the value of retaining the option to refurbish the property in the future is higher. Our estimates suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in the volatility around those growth expectations is associated with a reduction in CAPEX spending of 4.2 percent relative to the mean.
Next, we analyze the e˙ect of CAPEX investments on asset market value. A relevant question for investors is whether CAPEX are fully capitalized into property values, which would indicate that CAPEX improve investment returns. The results suggest that CAPEX are only partially capitalized into asset values. Over the complete economic cycle, we estimate that approximately 35 percent of every 1-percent increase in spending on expansion and improvement CAPEX is capitalized into subsequent asset market values. However, our results also suggest that the marginal economic e˙ect of CAPEX on market values is larger during recessions than during expansionary periods, likely refecting that investors only carry out the most proftable CAPEX projects under adverse economic conditions. We then explore the e˙ect of CAPEX on the incentives to sell. Our results suggest that higher CAPEX spending reduces the likelihood of sale. Consistent with the real option framework, CAPEX spending increases the value of the asset to the current owner who deploys the property under its highest and best use. As a result, the expected proft for the current owner from a sale to an alternative owner who would deploy the property under its second-best use declines, reducing the probability of sale. We estimate that a $1 increase in cumulative CAPEX spent on the property over the course of the holding period reduces the likelihood of sale in the subsequent year by 2 percent.
Lastly, we recognize that the investor's options with respect to investing in CAPEX or selling the property co-exist. Thus we estimate a multinomial Logit model that simultaneously accounts for these active management choices. We then test the infuence of past property performance on the choice of investing in CAPEX or selling the property. This analysis allows us to distinguish between two common investment/disposition patterns: a value-add strategy, whereby investors hold a relatively poorly performing property until they have made suÿcient improvements via CAPEX to realize a gain on the sale, versus the disposition e˙ect, whereby investors irrationally hold on to poorly performing investments in an attempt to avoid realizing looses. Under the value-add strategy, we would expect that lower past property performance results in higher CAPEX spending, consistent with the rationale that weaker properties require more management attention. By contrast, under the disposition e˙ect, we would expect that weaker past performance reduces the likelihood of sale. Our results are consistent with the value-add strategy. We fnd no evidence that, after controlling for market timing considerations, past performance infuences the likelihood of sale.
Our fndings contribute to the literature on the optionality of CAPEX. Bond, Shilling, and Wurtzebach (2014) fnd that CAPEX increase with market lease rates and our work is consistent with their fndings. Peng and Thibodeau (2011) and Ghosh and Petrova (2015) fnd that CAPEX decrease in the level of economic uncertainty, which increases the value of the option to delay improvements. Our work extends these prior studies in two ways.
First, we study income and volatility specifc to asset market segments rather than general economic uncertainty. Second, we consider a full set of investor choices that includes the capital expenditure option and the disposition decision. As a result, we derive a di˙erent set of predictions, underscoring the value of recognizing a fuller set of investor choices. Further, these previous studies fnd mixed evidence for whether, and if so, to what extent, CAPEX are capitalized into asset values. Our results are more consistent with Ghosh and Petrova (2015) , who fnd that CAPEX are to some extent incorporated into values.
A separate stream of literature examines disposition patterns as a function of di˙erent property types (Collett, Lizieri, and Ward, 2003) , national, regional and local economic drivers (Fisher, Gatzla˙, Geltner, and Haurin, 2004) , and the role of tax-eÿcient transactions such as 1031 exchanges (Ling and Petrova, 2015) . Crane and Hartzell (2010) explore the infuence of optimal tax timing, mean reverting property returns, and asymmetric information on REIT disposition patterns. Barthélémy and Prigent (2009) describe the optimal time to sell a diversifed real estate portfolio theoretically. Chinloy, Hardin, and Wu (2013) analyze the properties of frequently versus infrequently sold properties. We expand on this literature by accounting for a more realistic, richer choice set in terms of the real options available to real estate investors including the option to invest in CAPEX and the option to sell the asset.
Lastly, we contribute to the debate about evidence for irrational disposition patterns in real estate. Genesove and Mayer (2001) are the frst to document loss aversion in real estate. Using data on the Boston housing market, they fnd that homeowners subject to losses on the sale of their home set higher asking prices, attain higher selling prices, and are signifcantly less likely to sell than other owners. They conclude that, consistent with the disposition e˙ect, homeowners are reluctant to realize losses. Bokhari and Geltner (2011) extend this evidence to commercial real estate investors, who may be more sophisticated and thus less sensitive to loss aversion. Using a data set of US commercial real estate transactions, they confrm that investors facing a loss set higher asking prices, achieve higher transaction prices and experience a longer time-on-market, implying a lower likelihood of sale. Finally, Crane and Hartzell (2010) explore the evidence for the disposition e˙ect in corporate-level REIT investments. They fnd that REIT managers also tend to sell strongly performing properties while continuing to hold poorly performing investments. We show that, when accounting for a more realistic set of real options available to real estate investors, past property performance directly infuences CAPEX spending but bears no impact on the decision to sell after accounting for market timing considerations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our testable hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the NCREIF data. Section 4 presents empirical evidence for the real option view on CAPEX spending. Section 5 documents the impact of CAPEX on property market values. Section 6 illustrates the e˙ect of CAPEX on disposition decisions and contrasts the infuence of past property performance on CAPEX and disposition choices to distinguish between a rational value-add strategy and the disposition e˙ect. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
We adopt the real option analysis for incremental investment problems (e.g., Bertola, 1998; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1988) to highlight the optionality associated with capital expenditure investment and disposition decisions. Abstracting from the discussion of fxed and variable costs, we assume that an asset generates a simple proft fow (net operating income, NOI) of π t = H t M (K t ), where M (K t ) is a concave function of capital (K t ) invested in the asset, and H t is a random shift variable refecting uncertainty over future NOI. We assume that H t can be described by the geometric Brownian motion
where α H and σ H are the expected market rent growth rate and volatility, respectively, and E [dz H 2 ] = dt. For analytical convenience, we assume that M (K t ) takes a specialized Cobb-Douglas form M (K t ) = K t θ , 0 < θ < 1 and that κ represents the unit cost of capital. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that if physical depreciation and economic obsolescence occur exponentially through time following a Poisson process, then over a small time increment of dt, invested capital will depreciate with probability λKdt. Assuming no investment in CAPEX, then the asset will depreciate at the rate dK = −λKdt and the proft fow at time
. Thus, the expected value of the asset at purchase (t = 0) is
6 0 where ρ is the discount rate. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) then show that the optimal value of the income shock (H * ) that triggers investment in CAPEX in response to the asset's depreciation declines as the growth rate associated with the market rent (α) increases. Thus, higher market rental growth rates reduce the delay between capital expenditure investments.
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In addition, an increase in the volatility surrounding market rent (σ) increases the trigger value (H * ) and thus results in a longer time between capital expenditure investments.
Next, we introduce the concept of highest and best use from the appraisal literature to motivate incentives for trade and illustrate the interactions between CAPEX and asset disposition decisions. We begin by assuming that the asset's current owner is the marginal investor and thus, by defnition, deploys the building at its highest and best use (HBU), which is assumed to follow the income process described in equation (1). The HBU concept implies that the current owner maximizes the property's value, or else there is an incentive to trade. To capture this incentive, we assume that the building could be redeployed by a new owner at an alternative second-best use (SBU), realizing an income fow that corresponds to a random shift variable S t , which again refects uncertainty over future income.
The conversion of properties from their original use to a di˙erent use is a common strategy employed by investors in response to shifting demand and supply trends in a given location.
Examples include the conversion of oÿce buildings to apartments in downtown Philadelphia in response to deteriorating local oÿce market fundamentals; 2 the conversion of former industrial sites to multi-family properties in the context of local gentrifcation in North Philadelphia; 3 or the conversion of former oÿce properties to hotels in response to a surge in tourism in Tokyo where greenfeld development is hampered by restrictions on land supply. 4 .
We assume that S t also follows a geometric Brownian motion:
where α S and σ S are the expected growth rate and volatility associated with market rents for the alternative use, respectively, and E [dz S 2 ] = dt. Thus, at t = 0 we assume that the current owner is the highest and best user and the property value to this investor is greater than the value to an alternative user (
Opportunities to trade arise from the evolution of H t and S t through time. In other words, if S t ever exceeds H t then the current owner no longer values the property at its maximum (or highest and best use) and thus would recognize a gain by selling the property to another owner who would deploy it under the alternative second-best use. The assumption that the new owner deploys the property under a di˙erent second-best use explains why past CAPEX increase the value of the property for the current HBU owner but not to the SBU owner.
The current owner's opportunity to sell is a perpetual put option with payo˙ at any time
The value of this option is a function of the capital expenditure option that also depends on H and of the stochastic strike price (V (K, S, t)).
That is, the asset value in its current use at any point t, which determines whether it is 3 See https://www.bisnow.com/philadelphia/news/multifamily/philadelphia-industrial-multifamilyconversions-fnite-resources-80191 4 See https://www.wsj.com/articles/land-squeezed-developers-convert-oÿce-buildings-into-hotels-1493736404 optimal to sell to an alternative user, is conditional on investments in CAPEX prior to t.
In all, the option to invest in CAPEX impacts the decision to sell in two ways. First, past investments in CAPEX increase the current user's valuation and thus reduce the payo˙ from selling to an alternative investor, reducing the probability of sale. Second, the option to make future CAPEX to o˙set the e˙ects of depreciation increases the asset value to the current owner, which again lowers the potential payo˙ from and probability of disposition. As a result of this discussion, we formulate the following set of testable hypotheses.
H 1: Higher expected income growth increases subsequent CAPEX.
Based on the real option framework, uncertainty increases the value of keeping the option alive, all else equal. Therefore, an increase in the volatility of expected income growth raises the threshold value of income necessary to carry out CAPEX and thus produces a longer time delay between capital expenditure investments, reducing their likelihood.
H 2: Higher expected income growth volatility reduces subsequent CAPEX.
Next, CAPEX will increase the value of the asset to the current owner. Asset values increase with CAPEX because CAPEX restore the asset to an undepreciated state and enable the owner to capture the full market rent (assuming that leases are up for renewal). As CAPEX are more likely when market rental growth is strong, achievable full market rent after CAPEX is also higher, reinforcing the positive e˙ect on values.
H 3: An increase in CAPEX increases asset value.
Further, a lower likelihood of sale follows from higher CAPEX because higher CAPEX implies a higher current asset value and thus the probability that an alternative investor will value the property more than the current owner is reduced, all else being equal. Therefore, the probability of a sale declines following higher CAPEX.
H 4: Higher CAPEX reduce the subsequent likelihood of sale.
Data
We test our hypotheses in a sample of US direct real estate investments. We collect the required data on property and fnancial characteristics from N CREIF . We begin our analysis in 2001, the frst year for which NCREIF covers a signifcant number of properties and o˙ers the full breadth of CAPEX data required for our analysis; we end in 2014. Our initial sample is the entire N CREIF universe. We then focus on operating properties that form part of N CREIF 0 s N P I and where the values for CAPEX are non-negative. 5 Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of properties in the fnal sample.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
N CREIF reports di˙erent types of CAPEX. We focus on overall CAPEX and CAPEX spent on capital improvements and property expansions. NCREIF defnes capital improvement CAPEX as tangible improvements to the property that cannot be attributed to tenant space.
Includes, for example, roofs, parking lots, elevators, lobbies, HVAC systems, and security systems; CAPEX on expansions are defned as tangible improvements to the property that 5 Those represent accounting anomalies where excess reserves for CAPEX projects were booked and then reversed when the actual cost of the projects was revealed.
result in an expansion of the property's leaseable area. 6 We also obtain property market value data from N CREIF . It is important to note that we do not consider routine repairs and maintenance, which would fall under operating expenses, nor tenant incentives and lease commissions.
sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate undue infuence of outliers. The unconditional probability of sale in any given year is 2.6 percent. [ It is possible for a property to be bought and subsequently sold quickly, potentially within the same year. There are no instances of "fipping" properties in our fnal sample. the ordering of the most CAPEX-intensive sectors is similar, only the Apartment sector ranks just above the Oÿce sector on this measure and Industrial and Retail are approximately equal. This analysis suggests that Hotels are the most CAPEX-intensive property sector as far as expansion and improvement CAPEX are concerned. We also note that our data set contains observations where the value of CAPEX is zero; this is a useful feature of the data set because it rules out sample selection bias. Figure 2 shows the evolution of CAPEX over time and highlights their cyclical nature.
[ Table 2 and Figure 2 about here.]
Capital Expenditures as a Real Option
To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate an OLS model of annual total CAPEX and, separately, CAPEX on expansion and improvement, per square foot for asset i at time t (CAP EX i,t l ) as a function of income growth expectations and their volatility in the asset's location l:
where γ denotes the estimated coeÿcients, GE i,t−1 is the expected rate of market income growth at time t − 1, V OL i,t−1 is the volatility of expected market income growth during year t − 1, X t−1 is a matrix of control variables measured at time t − 1, and u it is the residual.
The control variables include building-level occupancy and the age of the asset at acquisition because these characteristics infuence CAPEX (Bokhari and Geltner, 2016) . We also control for asset size (log of square footage). The right hand side variables are lagged by one year in order to address endogeneity. We include fxed e˙ects for property type, year, fund type and geographic region (division). Standard errors are clustered by asset. Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect a positive value for γ 1 and a negative value for γ 2 .
In testing hypotheses 1 and 2, the identifying assumption is that variation in expected income growth and income growth volatility is exogenous to the property. This assumption is satisfed because the predictors refer to market level expectations of income growth and volatility where the market is defned by property sector, MSA (location) and year. Given the large number of assets in each market (property sector/geographic location/year cell), it is unlikely that a given asset would overly infuence the growth rate and volatility in the market. Consistent with hypothesis 2, that higher volatility of income growth is inversely related to subsequent CAPEX, our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the volatility of growth expectations is associated with a decline in CAPEX of $0.11, or 4.2 percent relative to the mean. Again, the results are consistent with standard option theory in that volatility increases the value of keeping alive the option to carry out CAPEX.
Our estimates further indicate that a one standard deviation increase in growth expectations is associated with an increase in expansion and improvement CAPEX of over 14 percent relative to the mean of $0.92. Our estimates also suggest that a one standard deviation increase in volatility reduces CAPEX on expansion but the estimate is not statistically signifcant. Our results imply that the CAPEX becomes more valuable when uncertainty is higher, consistent with standard option theory.
Capital Expenditures and Market Value
We test hypothesis 3 by estimating an OLS model of the natural logarithm of the market value per square foot for asset i at the end of year t as a function of the natural logarithm of CAPEX per square foot spent on expansion and improvement over the previous year t − 1:
where notation, control variables, and fxed e˙ects are as in equation (4). Standard errors are clustered by asset. As per hypothesis 3, we expect a positive value on γ 1 . The log-log specifcation allows us to estimate what percentage of each 1-percent increase in CAPEX is capitalized into market values. A relevant question for real estate owners is whether any increase in market value is directly proportional to the cost of CAPEX. If that is the case, then γ 1 = 1. If γ 1 < 1, then CAPEX may increase market value but return on investment.
In testing hypothesis 3, a potential threat to identifcation is reverse causality from asset values to CAPEX. The model implies that depreciation and obsolescence reduce the market value of the asset, hence the owner's incentive to invest in CAPEX. However, expansion and improvement projects take a signifcant time to plan and, once planned and initiated, they take a signifcant time to complete, given the lengthy planning and construction process. As a result, we expect that CAPEX completed by the end of year t − 1 a˙ect market values in year t. Market values in year t may well a˙ect future CAPEX, but not past CAPEX.
Therefore, we are able to use a lag structure in order to identify the e˙ect of CAPEX on market values, where we lag the predictors by one year. Table 4 presents the estimated coeÿcients for the OLS regression of equation (5). Column (1) reports the results for the full study period. We also replicate our estimations across recession versus non-recession sub-periods as defned by the NBER (columns (2) and (3), respectively).
[ CAPEX may increase market value, they may not improve investment returns.
Capital Expenditures and Disposition Decisions
To test hypothesis 4, we estimate a Logit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the asset was sold by the end of year t:
The notation, control variables, and fxed e˙ects are as above. CAP EX refers to expansion and improvement CAPEX over the year t − 1. We control for exogenous reasons to sell, such as target fund life, and market timing by including fund-type and year indicators. Standard errors are clustered by asset. Per hypothesis 4, we expect a negative sign on the coeÿcient γ 1 .
In testing hypothesis 4, a potential threat to identifcation is that CAPEX and the decision to hold or sell the property are simultaneously determined. The choice to invest in CAPEX implies the choice to hold on to the asset, but only until the CAPEX project is completed.
Once a given CAPEX project is completed, the owner may well choose to dispose of the asset as shown in the model. Therefore, we are again able to use lag structures in order to identify the e˙ect of CAPEX on the subsequent decision to sell. We expect that CAPEX projects completed by the end of year t − 1 a˙ect the decision to sell the property in year t, consistent with a value-add strategy whereby investors continue to hold an asset until they have made suÿcient improvements to generate a gain on sale. Table 5 presents the results. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that when taking into account active management in the form of cumulative CAPEX since acquisition reduces the probability of subsequent disposition, consistent with hypothesis 4. In column (2), we test the e˙ect of the previous year's CAPEX on expansion and improvements and fnd a similar e˙ect on sale.
In economic terms, our estimates imply that an increase in cumulative CAPEX psf by $1 reduces the chance of sale in the subsequent year by 2 percent. Our estimates further imply that a $1 increase in CAPEX spent on expansion and improvement in a given year reduces the chance of sale in the subsequent year by 3 percent.
[ Table 5 about here.]
Lastly, we account for the fact that the CAPEX and disposition options coexist. We estimate a multinomial Logit model where the baseline outcome is continuing to hold the property; the second choice is to invest in CAPEX; the third choice is to sell the property.
As noted in our hypothesis development, both CAPEX and disposition decisions are real options that are driven by the underlying proft fow generated by the property. The disposition e˙ect described in the literature would suggest that disposition decisions are irrationally driven by past performance where investors are more likely to sell a strongly performing property while holding on to a poorly performing property in an attempt to avoid realizing losses. In our fnal set of tests, we contrast the infuence of past performance on disposition decisions with its infuence on CAPEX choices. Table 6 presents the results.
[ Table 6 about here.]
Our estimates suggest that past performance, in terms of total returns and appreciation returns, infuences CAPEX spending but has no signifcant impact on disposition choices.
Under the disposition e˙ect, we would expect that properties with stronger past performance, controlling for market timing considerations (hence why we include time fxed e˙ects), are more likely to be sold in the subsequent year as investors hold on to poorly performing properties in an attempt to avoid realizing losses. We fnd that past performance infuences CAPEX decisions. Our estimates suggest that a property with lower past performance, in terms of total returns or appreciation returns, is more likely to experience CAPEX spending in the subsequent year. This result is consistent with a value-add strategy where a investors hold on to and invest in a potentially poorly performing property for as long as is required to realize a gain on the eventual sale.
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The results from the multinomial choice model in Table 6 do not imply a normative statement about what investors should do. Rather, the results document that the relationship between past performance and the disposition decision implied by the literature on the disposition e˙ect becomes insignifcant when accounting for the simultaneous existence of the option to invest in CAPEX. It is important to note that the CAPEX option is not part of the analysis in the literature on the disposition e˙ect.
Conclusion
The existing literature in real estate investment recognizes a set of real options available to property owners, including the option to invest in CAPEX and the option to sell the property, but considers these options to be independent from one another. We model a more realistic choice set in which the option to invest in CAPEX and the option to sell are real options driven by the underlying economic fundamentals. We show how these options are interrelated, producing a set of testable hypotheses about the occurrence of CAPEX, the relationship between CAPEX and property value, and the consequences for the likelihood of sale.
Our estimates support predictions from real option theory that investors increase CAPEX spending during periods of higher expected income growth, when the returns to CAPEX projects is higher, and reduce CAPEX in periods of higher volatility, when the value of retaining the option to invest in CAPEX later is higher. Our results suggest that CAPEX are partially capitalized into property values. We also present novel evidence that CAPEX signifcantly reduces the likelihood of sale, a connection that is hitherto absent from the existing literature. Our fndings also suggest that past performance infuences CAPEX spending but not disposition decisions, consistent with a value-add investment strategy.
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